A2
Whether there are four cardinal virtues?
[a]
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.
For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above ([1568] Q [58], A [4]).
But that which directs other things ranks before them.
Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.
[b]
Objection 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues.
Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2.
Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.
[c]
Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another.
But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some.
Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.
[d]
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues."
[e]
I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
[f]
For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways.
First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence."
Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues.
For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways.
First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a curb, which we call "Temperance."
Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e. g. through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude."
[g]
In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue.
For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude."
[h]
Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply.
The others are principal, each in its own genus.
[i]
Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.
[j]
Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.
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