A6
Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?
[a]
Objection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love.
For love is a passion, as stated above ([1242] Q [26], A [2]).
But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8.
Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.
[b]
Objection 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10.
If, therefore, whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.
[c]
Objection 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes.
But some things are done from hatred.
Therefore all things are not done from love.
[d]
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
[e]
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated above ([1243] Q [1], A [2]).
Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one.
Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind.
[f]
Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite.
But here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.
[g]
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [1244] (A [5]; Q [27], A [4]) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love.
Wherefore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.
[h]
Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on ([1245] Q [29], A [2]).
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